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Questions 
What have we learnt on how to manage the risks surrounding the securitisation of refugees? In 
what situations was the civilian nature of the asylum/refugee space best preserved? What are 
the risks to registered and unregistered and local populations of a securitisation of the refugee 
question? 
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1. Overview  
This rapid review synthesises data from academic, policy and NGO sources on the securitisation 
of refugees, with a particular focus on Rohingya in Bangladesh. Although not referred to as 
refugees in Bangladesh, this report refers to Rohingya fleeing Myanmar as refugees. There is 
limited research on managing the risk of securitisation of refugees, rather the focus tends to be 
on the securitisation process itself and the provision of security to refugees. However, there are 
policies mentioned in the various studies examined that somewhat address avoiding 
securitisation of refugees. As Rohingya refugees have been coming to Bangladesh since the 
1970s, there are lessons to be learnt from past experiences of how Bangladesh has dealt with 
these refugees. 
Securitisation in relation to refugees is defined as constructing refugees as a societal threat 
through political and media rhetoric, which in turn results in stricter policies away from 
international refugee law. There has been a securitisation of Rohingya in Bangladesh due to a 
number of factors, including: 
• Spread of Islamic extremists in refugee camps; 
• The mass of people crossing the border used for arms and drug smuggling;  
• Competition for jobs in a poor region in a relatively poor country; 
• Competition for limited resources; 
• Inflation on food and housing; 
• Destruction of forests and plantations; 
• A political desire for Rohingya to return to Myanmar, and 
• The rhetoric that does not recognise Rohingya as refugees. 
The securitisation of Rohingya refugees has previously led to police encouraging them to return 
to Myanmar. Rohingya refugees face a number of security issues both inside and outside the 
camps, with the significant number of undocumented refugees being of particular concern. 
Undocumented refugees are more likely to be harassed and detained outside of camps, as well 
as being easy targets for criminal activities. However, those with United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) photo identification documents are more likely to be 
released once charged by the police. There have been reports of arrests, harassment, and a 
pushback of recent arrivals, along with physical abuse in camps in order to persuade refugees to 
voluntarily depart. It is also argued that camps are harshly policed and refugees seldom get 
permission to leave (Parnini, 2013). 
If refugees are hosted in camps it is recommended that they are away from the border, in 
wealthier parts of the country, and that camps consist of less than 20,000 people. This makes the 
security of camps easier and also avoids the securitisation of refugees that is likely to occur as a 
result of border activities and competition for resources. Aid for refugees has to be tied to a wider 
development package, as if the host community does not share in the improvements of living 
standards, resentment towards refugees is likely to form leading to the securitisation of refugees. 
One of the issues is that the Rohingya are viewed as temporary residents and thus there is no 
long-term development and processes towards integration. This prevents policies from being 
formed that deal with the securitisation of refugees. 
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Community policing has worked in a number of camps, as it ensures the active participation of 
refugees in their own security and also increases female involvement in security. It also helps to 
overcome issues such as corruption, distrust of the police, or weak performance of authorities. 
Community policing takes advantage of local knowledge, customary practices and traditional 
leadership networks. In order to maintain the civilian nature of camps it is important to ensure 
that armed groups are not present. In Sierra Leone this was done by forming a separate 
internment camp for known militants and creating security screenings at the border (UNHCR, 
2006b).  
It is important that refugees maintain their freedom; it is argued by UNHCR (2006a, 2006b, 2011) 
that they should be allowed to leave the camps and refugee camps should not become controlled 
by the military, as this undermines the humanitarian and civilian character of the camp. However, 
the presence of a well-disciplined and well-equipped military force in the vicinity of a camp may 
enhance security. 
 
2. Securitisation  
Securitisation theory 
Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, of the Copenhagen School, define securitisation as a successful 
speech act ‘through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political 
community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a 
call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491). 
However, Stritzel (2007, p. 377) has suggested going beyond this definition in order to 
understand the importance and precise patterns of interaction. He suggests working with three 
layers of securitisation:  
• The performative force of an articulated threat text;  
• Its embededness in existing discourses, and  
• The positional power of securitising actors.  
McGahan (2009: 3) ties the theory of securitisation to immigration, and argues that the 
Copenhagen School of securitisation ‘offers a lens through which to highlight certain actors and 
processes in analysing immigration policies, particularly how societal threats are constructed and 
defended.’ However, he highlights that ‘ordinary citizens – in addition to elites – are routinely 
involved in routine practices that shape the securitisation of migration and contribute to a general 
culture of fear’ (McGrahan, 2009: 3). According to McGrahan’s analysis the dynamics of the host 
country must be taken into account when analysing the securitisation of refugees and migrants. 
For example, the political, economic, and social dynamics of the country impact on how and what 
issues are securitised. The securitisation of refugees transfers directly into how they are treated, 
particularly from a security/policing perspective, which makes it important to examine here. 
The discursive practices of politicians and the media construct the identity of asylum seekers, 
and thus make policy options more or less available. When asylum seekers are portrayed as 
genuine refugees, policies are often consistent with international laws. However, when media 
coverage and politicians’ rhetoric construct asylum seekers as a threat to the state, harsh border 
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control policies that undermine principles of international refugee laws become more acceptable 
(Watson, 2007). 
The rise of xenophobia towards asylum seekers has led to a view of refugees as perpetrators of 
insecurity, rather than as victims. Long-term state security has become intrinsically linked to the 
security provided to refugees, and thus the securitisation of refugees has infringed on their 
freedom (UNHCR, 2006a). 
Securitisation of Rohingya 
Rahman (2010, p. 234) examines the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh through the lens of 
being a security concern, and argues that they are a ‘potential threat to Bangladesh’s internal 
stability and a source of interstate tension between Myanmar and Bangladesh’. One of the main 
issues is the spread of Islamic militants, as Rohingya refugee camps have previously been fertile 
grounds for recruitment by extremists. Moreover, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) is 
said to be training Islamic militants across Bangladesh and have expanded their own operations 
into Bangladesh. Rohingya refugees crossing the border from Myanmar are also used by arms 
and drug smugglers to traffic across the border, with the large numbers helping to evade 
detection (Rahman, 2010). From an economic perspective, Bangladesh is a relatively poor 
country facing chronic poverty and high population density and the influx of Rohingya refugees, 
mainly to the poorest areas in Bangladesh, wiling to work for lower wages has a negative impact 
on the labour market and creates tensions between the local population and the refugees. A 
situation exacerbated by many Rohingya leaving refugee camps, or being denied access, and 
working illegally (Parnini, Othman, & Ghazali, 2013). Table 1 demonstrates the significant 
number of Rohingya in Bangladesh, with the scale adding to the securitisation of refugees as 
they compete for resources and employment. 
With the extremely high number of refugees that cross the border at one time, there is a 
competition for the limited resources available. This also leads to the destruction of forests and 
plantations, which creates tension between the local and refugee populations (Rahman, 2010). 
Additionally, the significant number of Rohingya refugees leads to inflation in food and housing in 
an already impoverished area, as there is not enough of either available for the larger population 
(Yee, 2017). Finally, there is the dynamic where the host country does not want the Rohingya to 
settle and integrate, but rather want them to eventually be repatriated to Myanmar, as happened 
in the early 2000s, which adds to the securitisation of the refugees (Rahman, 2010).1 In 
Bangladesh the main political parties compete with each other in arguing for tough refugee and 
asylum policies, whilst the host community thinks that refugees in the camps are provided with 
better services and take locals’ jobs (UNHCR, 2011).  
Moreover, those fleeing to Bangladesh from conflict in Mynamar are not considered as refugees 
and thus are not protected under international refugee law. In the broader region, under ASEAN 
and the Bali Process refugees are framed within a security\border control paradigm. Focusing on 
‘securitising’ migration through eliminating human smuggling and trafficking they encourage 
states to consider refugees as the responsibility of the developed world. The ‘irregular migrant’ 
label is used by states to avoid their obligations to displaced persons such as with the Rohingya, 
and also makes the securitisation of refugees an easier process (Kneebone, 2016). 
                                                   
1 Rohingyas have been repatriated in deals with Myanmar before, but have then returned to Bangladesh as 
tensions in Myanmar rise. 
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Unrecognised as refugees in Bangladesh, Rohingya’s statelessness and lack of recognition as 
citizens either in Myanmar or Bangladesh makes it difficult to address their plight as refugees 
(Cheung, 2012). 
 
Table 1: Rohingya population in Bangladesh as of October 2017 
  Source: ISCG (2017) 
 
As a result of the securitisation of Rohingya refugees as a threat to the population, as discussed 
above, a number of security aspects have been developed to police and encourage them to 
return to Myanmar. For instance, there have been reports of arrests, harassment, and a 
pushback of recent arrivals, along with physical abuse in camps in order to persuade refugees to 
voluntarily depart. Moreover, a number of refugees were forced to return to Myanmar, with 
women and children often targeted (Ullah, 2011). Previously the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh 
have been harshly policed with no one allowed to leave without signed permission, with police 
harassment and beatings often the result for those caught. However, according to Parnini (2013) 
camps are favoured as through donors and international aid organisations, the Bangladeshi 
government and citizens have gained finances and employment.  
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3. Avoiding Securitisation 
Although encampment of refugees is not recommended, it often cannot be avoided in the first 
instance; however, planning is imperative to maintain security. Size and location are important 
factors in security and protecting vulnerable groups.  Large camps are difficult to manage 
properly and UNHCR (2006a) recommends camps with less than 20,000 refugees and with at 
least 45 square metres of space per person. Additionally, it is advised that refugee camps should 
be placed (or relocated) a significant distance from borders in order to improve security. For 
example, in 2003 refugees in Guinea were relocated from the south to more central locations, 
reducing the threat of combatants infiltrating the camps. However, host governments are often 
reluctant to have camps in locations away from the border for fear it will make it harder to return 
them. To avoid the securitisation of refugees it is also important that camps are not placed in the 
poorest areas of the country, where competition for resources is likely to be higher (UNHCR, 
2006a). In Bangladesh camps are larger with more than 20,000 people, close to the border, and 
in one of the poorest parts of the country, thus making the security of refugees harder and adding 
to the securitisation of refugees (Cheung, 2012). The positioning and size of Rohingya refugee 
sites in Bangladesh is demonstrated in Map 1. 
Refugee protection needs to address the relationship between refugees and their hosts. In 
developing countries this means ensuring that the standards of living of refugees and host 
populations are as similar as possible. Improvements must benefit the entire local community 
and there must not be a perception that refugees have higher living standards. The mutual 
advances for both communities should be communicated to the host population, along with 
lessons on co-existence. Mutual benefits include programmes that help stimulate the local 
economy and minimise the impact of refugees on the environment. For instance, firewood 
collection and access to water are a source of conflict between Rohingya and the local 
population around the camps, which often lead to assaults (UNHCR, 2011). Therefore, firewood 
should be harvested from sustainable sources or purchased from local contractors and supplied 
to the camps, thus ensuring the local population is not negatively impacted by the refugees and 
in turn avoiding friction (UNHCR, 2006a).  
According to Berti (2015) the issue with treating refugees as “temporary guests” is that it results 
in no long-term development and integration. Rather there should be a shift in legal frameworks, 
allowing refugees to obtain work permits, with a key priority being livelihood and income 
generation, lending geared to fostering micro-enterprise, and vocational training. Refugees are 
often analysed through the humanitarian lens, which creates an artificial separation between 
regional and human security concerns. However, successfully tackling the emergency and 
boosting the long-term resilience of both refugee and host communities should be a priority in 
order to prevent long-term destabilisation and the securitisation of refugees (Berti, 2015).  
Huysmans (1998) argues that a desecuritisation narrative should also be formed to counteract 
the securitisation of refugees. This should provide an alternative concept demonstrating what is 
good and bad, right and wrong, and how to develop an alternative method of integrating 
individuals into the political community on the basis of particular values. In short, he argues for a 
counter campaign against the securitisation of refugees, demonstrating how they can make a 
positive impact and focusing on how it is good and right. 
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Map 1: Influx of Rohingya into Bangladesh as of October 2017 
 
Source: ISCG (2017) 
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4. Security issues 
Inside camps 
Inside the refugee camps Rohingya face a number of threats from authorities and other refugees. 
According to UNHCR (2011) these include:  
• Domestic violence; 
• Rape, and a lack of safe shelters for the victims of rape;  
• Early and forced marriage; 
• Child labour and trafficking;  
• Detention; 
• Restrictions on freedom of movement, and 
• Extortion and exploitation.  
When refugees are prevented from leaving the camps these issues are exacerbated. 
Furthermore, local police often fail in providing refugees with adequate security in the camps and 
do not have the same understanding of the community (UNHCR, 2011). 
 
Outside camps 
As Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh do not have proper documentation due to their status of not 
being recognised as refugees they face a number of issues such as being harassed and arrested 
outside of the camps. The UNHCR has given photo identification cards to a number of camp 
refugees above the age of five, but they are not officially endorsed by the government and do not 
prevent refugees from being detained. However, refugees with valid UNHCR identity cards have 
better chances of being released once charged. In order to leave camps refugees need an 
official pass, which they often have to buy illegally (UNHCR, 2011). Ticktin (2006) argues that 
undocumented asylum seekers often turn to desperate measures in order to survive and are 
easily taken advantage of. However, on the other hand they find it easier to find work on the 
illegal market. Documented asylum seekers without work permits are often stuck in a limbo 
where they do not have permission to work and are reliant on the system, which prevents them 
from becoming normal citizens and integrating into society.  
Outside the camps many of the 200,000 self-settled refugees who have been in Bangladesh 
since the earlier waves of refugees have achieved a degree of integration due to their cultural, 
linguistic, and religious similarities. However, their irregular status does pose a constant threat 
and those both inside and outside the camps face corruption, exploitation and crime. For 
instance, in 2009 local authorities forcibly removed self-settled refugees from the periphery of 
Kutupalong camp, and in 2010 self-settled refugees fled to the camps for protection after a 
campaign of violent arrests, detentions and forced repatriation by the local authorities (Cheung, 
2012).  
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5. Policing Refugees 
Community Policing  
The protection of refugees in camps needs refugees’ own active participation to be a success. To 
overcome corruption, distrust of the police, or weak performance of authorities, community 
policing is often used. By making use of local knowledge, customary practices and traditional 
leadership networks an alternative policing system to deliver justice can be formed. This involves 
exchanging information, mediation, crowd control, and a physical presence in the camp through 
foot patrols. Community policing of refugee camps demonstrates refugee ownership of the 
security process. In Nyarugusu refugee camp in western Tanzania, refugee guards have been 
successfully involved in policing since the early 2000s. Through community policing in refugee 
camps concerns over outside intervention is overcome (Brankamp, 2016). 
Neighbourhood-watch programmes have been installed in camps in Zambia and have led to a 
reduction in crime, the identification of armed elements, and improvements in aid distribution. In 
Sierra Leone, Liberian refugee wardens work with the local police leading to an improvement in 
camp security. Refugee security mechanisms work well if they complement the law-enforcement 
system in the host country. However, they must be monitored properly to avoid vigilantism and 
harassment (UNHCR 2006a).  
In Buduburam Refugee Camp, Ghana, a neighbourhood-watch scheme was implemented. Prior 
to this the security situation in Buduburam settlement was frail and the number of police 
personnel limited, so the refugees volunteered to patrol the settlement at night to enhance their 
own security. The UNHCR supported the initiative by: 
• Requesting the Ghanaian police to screen volunteers;  
• Assisting the neighbourhood-watch to draft Statutes of conduct and operation together 
with the camp management and the police;  
• Training the neighbourhood-watch members;  
• Supporting the creation of a female wing and encouraging women to join;  
• Equipping the neighbourhood-watch teams with uniforms, boots, whistles, bicycles, 
walkie-talkies, first aid kits etc.);  
• Providing free medical assistance, and  
• Monitoring and helping to improve their work. 
As a result of the neighbourhood-watch, security in the camp has been greatly enhanced and 
common crime has been drastically reduced. The female participation in security has also 
increased and the relationship between refugees and the local police has also improved 
(UNHCR, 2006b). 
However, previous experiences with community policing of Rohingya in camps under 
Bangladeshi authority have come under some criticism. Refugees International (2005) reported 
abuse and intimidation in camps at the hands of Bangladeshi authorities and Rohingya 
volunteers who are picked by the Bangladeshi camp manager. Moreover they argue that the 
Rohingya volunteers acted as an arm of the government and played a major role in forcing 
refugees to repatriate. 
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Maintaining Civilian Nature 
Refugees face threats from organised crime, errant military and police forces, anti-government 
militants, local populations, and fellow refugees. Their vulnerability is magnified as they often 
have limited resources and broken family and community structures. Crimes such as theft, 
assault and domestic violence to child abuse, rape, and human trafficking are common against 
refugees (UNCHR, 2006a). 
Security in refugee camps is linked to the maintenance of its civilian character and thus the 
presence of armed elements, incursions by militias, cross-border raids, and recruitment from the 
camp prevents the establishment of a neutral and secure refugee environment. Refugee camps 
should have an exclusively civilian character, and all actors have an obligation to maintain it. 
However, states have the primary responsibility and should make efforts to locate refugee camps 
at a reasonable distance from the border – this often does require international support and 
technical assistance (UNHCR, 2006b). 
Armed groups in refugee situations often take control of aid for their own purposes. Camps are 
also seen as prime recruitment locations, especially when the refugees in them do not have 
access to the labour market and education. This is further exacerbated if the refugees are 
prevented from leaving the camp. Therefore, wherever armed elements are present, the host 
country must assure the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum by disarming and 
demobilizing armed exiles, preventing the flow of arms between refugees, protecting refugees 
from attack and intimidation, and separating combatants or war criminals from refugees 
(UNCHR, 2006a).  
In Sierra Leone, strategies were needed to separate ex-combatants entering the country from 
Liberia. Thus, ex-combatants were separated and kept in a special internment camp with 
rehabilitation facilities. UNHCR took responsibility for the internees’ civilian family members and 
represented their interests – including family visits from the refugee camps to the internment 
camp. As part of this process security screenings were conducted by the police at main entry 
points to ensure the civilian character of Liberians crossing into Sierra Leone and refugee 
relocation convoys. Identified combatants were not repatriated but rather transported to the 
internment camp. As a result of this process, hundreds of ex-combatants have been separated at 
border crossings and interned and the refugee camps have generally maintained their civilian 
character (UNHCR, 2006b). 
Refugees International (2005) has claimed that in Rohingya camps in Bangladesh in the early 
2000s Rohingya refugees were not allowed to form refugee committees or even to hold meetings 
in the camps. Additionally, they argue that Rohingya refugees were prevented from establishing 
their own management committees to oversee service delivery in key sectors like food 
management, water, sanitation, health and education. These elements of denying the Rohingya 
to represent their own community go against maintaining the civilian nature of the camps, as they 
deny them basic rights. 
Heavily Policed Camps 
If national legislation ignores the rights of refugees it limits their ability to become self-reliant. For 
example, Kenya and Tanzania do not allow refugees to leave camps and as a result most 
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refugees remain dependent on humanitarian aid. This puts a financial burden on the international 
community and leads to idleness and apathy in the camps, which in turn may push refugees into 
crime or military activity.  
The ladder approach is an assessment-and-response tool to deal with escalating threats to the 
civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and to security in camps. Measures are 
ranked in order of their ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ nature. Soft measures include preventive steps that build 
cooperation with national law-enforcement mechanisms. Intermediate measures include 
international support for national security forces and the deployment of international missions 
and observers. Hard methods involve the use of regional or international military forces and 
include activities such as monitoring, intelligence-gathering, reconnaissance, situation 
assessment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants, border control, camp-perimeter 
security, and the training of national military forces (UNHCR, 2006a).  
The presence of military forces in a refugee camp undermines the humanitarian and civilian 
character of the camp, but the presence of a well-disciplined and well-equipped military force in 
the vicinity of a camp may enhance security by preventing armed groups from infiltrating or 
recruiting in camps (UNHCR, 2006a). 
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